Buffalo Law Review
Volume 9

Number 1

Article 35

10-1-1959

Constitutional Law—Constitutionality of Hospital Licensing
Regulations
Buffalo Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview

Recommended Citation
Buffalo Law Review, Constitutional Law—Constitutionality of Hospital Licensing Regulations, 9 Buff. L.
Rev. 76 (1959).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol9/iss1/35

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
plaintiff had garages for rent, the access to which was cut off for a number
of months longer than originally anticipated by street repair contractors.
Recovery was denied, the court concerning itself only with the question of
reasonableness in the light of the extension of time.
Abutting owners have initiated a good deal of litigation concerning parking
meters as an obstruction to access, but the question has become settled in
most jurisdictions, the interference being construed as reasonable provided the
8
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meters are placed primarily to control traffic and not primarily for revenue.
In affirming the determination of a "slight" interference with access in the
present case, the Court compares the situation with that in Jones Beach
Boulevard Estate v. MosesY There, plaintiff's predecessor in title had sold land
to a state park commission for use as a parkway, reserving land for driveways
to permit him access to the proposed parkway. After it was built, the use of left
turns was so limited by traffic regulations that in order to enter the parkway
from plaintiff's property to travel north, it was necessary to drive five miles in
the opposite direction before a turn around was permitted. The regulation
was upheld as one which, although inconvenient to the abutter, being adopted
to benefit the travelling public, would have to be borne by the abutter. As
pointed out in the present case, this was a great deal more inconvenient than
the interference suffered by the gas station owners. Unfortunately, the Court
does not make clear how much, or what kind of interference is necessary to
amount to such a substantial obstruction as to overcome the benefit to the
travelling public. Apparently the threshhold lies quantitatively someplace between a few hours a day as here, and twenty-four hours a day as in the taxi
between inconvenient traffic regustand case;' 0 qualitatively, it is apparently
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HOSPITAL LICENSING REGULATIONS

The Board of Hospitals of the City of New York, had denied petitioner's
application for a license to operate a private proprietary hospital since he had
not complied with new regulations of the City Hospital Code governing the
maintenance and operation of private proprietary hospitals. In a proceeding
to review and annul the order of the Board to discontinue operation of the
hospital, the Supreme Court, Special Term, denied the application to review.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals upon constitutional grounds, from
an order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirming the order of
the Special Term.
The regulations in question became effective October 1, 1956. While pro7. Cassidy v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33 A.2d 142 (1943); Gilsey Buildings
v. Incorporated Village of Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N.Y.S.2d 694, af'd 258
App. Div. 901, 16 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2d Dep't 1939) (mem.).
8. Monsour v. City of Shreveport, 194 La. 625, 194 So. 569 (1939).
9. 268 N.Y. 362, 197 N.E.2d 313 (1935).

10. Supra note 4.
11.
12.

Supra note 9.
Supra note 4.
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viding for various changes in staff requirements and single room bed space,
the regulations also required each bed to have a floor area of 70 square feet,
in other than private rooms, where formerly the requirement was about 62.5
feet.' 3 Petitioner argued that the regulations violated the equal protection
clause of both the Federal and State Cofistitutions, since they do not equally
apply to municipal and voluntary nonprofit hospitals, and are in violation
of due process of law under the same provisions.' 4
I In affirming the order of the Appellate Division, the Court in Engelsher v.
Jacobs,15 found that it was within the power of the legislature to issue regulations calculated to reach such private proprietary hospitals as a valid exercise of
the police power of the state, in that such institutions deal directly with the
health of the citizens of the State. Since the legislature has given the Board
control over private proprietary hospitals only, and has authorized the Board to
issue regulations affecting municipal or nonprofit voluntary hospitals, the legislature, in effect, has established such private hospitals as a separate class. This
classification is based upon the theory that private hospitals, without regulation, are immune from governmental scrutiny, whereas municipal and
voluntary hospitals enjoy no such privilege. As a class, the private hospitals are
treated alike under the regulations. Since equal protection requires only that
all in the same class be treated in a like manner, the equal protection clause is
not offended.' 6
The validity of the new regulations is not limited by the fact that petitioner
had constructed his hospital in full compliance with the laws previously in
force.' 7 The only limitation upon the exercise of the State's police power
is that the regulations be reasonably calculated to accomplish the end sought.' 8
There can be no doubt that they are calculated to promote the health and welfare
of the public generally. Taking into consideration the expenditure incurred as
a result of the regulations, the Court suggests that where there are two or
more beds in a room, petitioner could remove one or more beds, thus incurring
only a loss of profits. Since the Court could not find, as a matter of law, that
the regulations were unreasonable, it decided that the Board had not acted
in an arbitrary manner in refusing to issue a license to petitioner.' 9
The dissent, found it difficult to understand why considerations affecting
public health should apply only to private hospitals and not to the municipal
13. This regulation would have the effect of requiring petitioners to remove approximately 125 beds in double rooms that have only 125 square feet of space.
14. N.Y. CoNsr. art. I §§ 6, 11; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
15. 5 N.Y.2d 370, 184 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1959).
.16. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (188); Radice v. People,
264 U.S. 292 (1924); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); People v. Havnor, 149 N.Y.
195, 43 N.E. 541 (1896).
17. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Health Dep't v. Rector, Church
Wardens and Vestrymen of Trinity Church, 145 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895).
18. Purity Extract and Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912); People v. Luhrs,
195 N.Y. 377, 89 N.E. 171 (1909).
19. People v. McWilliams, 185 N.Y. 92, 77 N.E. 785 (1906); People v. Creelman, 206
N.Y. 570, 100 N.E. 446 (1912).
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or voluntary hospitals. Equal protection requires that the police power
be exercised evenly and without discrimination. 20 Furthermore, there is a
violation when the law serves the interest of a particular class instead of the
general public, although the legislation is ostensibly directed to accomplish
the latter.2 1 The possibility that private hospitals will be motivated by their
desire to increase income is not sufficient, in itself, to warrant more severe regulation of the private hospitals as compared with the other hospitals. The
possibility of self-interest is as great in the municipal and voluntary hospitals
where trustees or public officers are held responsible for the performance
of their duties. There must be discrimination where the same act is, or is not
reprehensible, depending upon who performs the act. If the regulations are based
purely upon promotion of the public health, petitioner ought to be allowed to
prove, upon trial, that the voluntary and municipal hospitals are not subject
to similar restrictions. The petitioner should not be summarily ordered to
discontinue the hospital if the patients in the other hospitals are subject to
similar conditions prohibited by the regulations.
The regulations deprive petitioner of his property without due process of
law, because such discrimination is not related to the public health. The fact
that the regulations distinguish between single rooms in hospitals licensed
before and after October 1, 1956, and make no distinction between double
rooms in hospitals licensed before and after that date, is further evidence
that the regulations are not entirely related to the public health. The order
appealed from should be modified by eliminating the direction to discontinue
operation of the hospital and remanding the matter for a trial in the nature
of an alternative mandamus.
The claim that state legislation violates the equal protection provisions of
the Federal and State constitutions is the last resort of constitutional arguments. 22 The dissent is argued quite logically, but logical consistency is not a
requisite to the exercise of the police power:
a state may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented,
and that if the class discriminated against is or reasonably might be
considered to define those from whom the evil mainly is to be feared,
it properly may be picked out. A lack of abstract symmetry does not
23
matter. The question is a practical one, dependent upon experience.
It appears that the regulations are calculated to protect the interest of
the general public. There is no evidence that the private hospitals catered to
only a particular segment of the public. Therefore, if reasonable, the regulations have fulfilled the requirements of equal protection, and the question
of motive should not arise. The legislature has merely recognized the need
of regulation in the area of private hospitals and has limited itself to regulating
20. New York Sanitary Utilization Co. v. Department of Health, 32 Misc. 577,
67 N.Y.S. 324 (Sup. Ct. 1900), aff'd 61 App. Div. 106, 70 N.Y. Supp. 510 (lst Dep't 1901).
21. Ibid.
22. Buck v. Bell, supra note 15.
23. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1919).
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that particular area. It is not bound to extend the regulation to all the cases
which it might possibly reach. As to the distinction made between private and
double rooms, the balancing of the interest between the public health and
the cost to petitioner might practically weigh in favor of petitioner in respect
to the single rooms; and in favor of the public interest in respect to the double
rooms. The fact that the removal of one bed from a double room would leave
the remaining bed a floor area of 125 square feet, when viewed abstractly,
would appear to be unreasonable. Although the regulations may bear heavily
upon the petitioner here, petitioner must show that the regulations do an
injustice to the class generally.2 4 This has not been shown. It is difficult for
a court of law to declare such regulations to be unreasonable, when the
legislature, through its administrative agencies, has a greater knowledge of
the factors that relate to the reasonableness of such regulations. Therefore,
unless a clear discrimination appears, the Court cannot hold, as a matter of
25
law, that the regulations are unreasonable.
GRoss RECEIPTS TAX: APPLICATION TO FOREIGN CORPORATION

Cities in New York State having a population of one million or more are
enabled to impose a gross receipts tax.26 New York City has such a tax. r
The requisite incidence of local activity or presence within the city, necessary
to enable the city to impose this tax on the gross receipts of a foreign corporation, has been a problem in this area in recent years. In the Court of Appeals
decision, Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates, Inc. v. City of New York,2 8 an
action for declaratory judgment was brought by the plaintiff, a Massachusetts
corporation, which contended that the above mentioned tax law as applied to it
was unconstitutional because its New York City activities constituted interstate commerce exclusively. 29 As the Court stated: "The applicable rule of law
is old and simple to state but less simple to apply. 30° From the facts of each
case the court must determine whether a local activity takes place and whether
it is a separable business, distinct from the flow of interstate commerce or an
integral part of that flow. The language of the above formula admits the
existence of local activity which will not constitute an incident of taxation.
The question presented is, how far can a corporation extend its activities without securing, in the eyes of the court, an advantage over locally taxed concerns?
Business wise, it is advantageous to keep close to the market. By maintain24. Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499 (1931).
25. Supra note 18.
26. N.Y. GEN. Crr LAW § 24-a.
27.

NEW YoRx

Crry

ADnSmTRATmv

CODE §

B46-2.0.

28. 5 N.Y.2d 347, 184 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1959).
29. The General Business and Financial Tax Laws prescribe an exclusive method
of judicial review (NEw YoRx CiTy ADmnmmTAnV CODE § B46-9.0), but when the
jurisdiction of the taxing authority is challenged on constitutional grounds, that the statute
is unconstitutional or by its own terms does not apply an action for declaratory judgment
may be maintained. (M & M Transportation Co. v. City of New York, - Misc. -, 84
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1948).
30. Supra note 28 at 354, 184 N.Y.S.2d 623, 628 (1959).
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